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LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF FARMLAND 
SUCCESSION:  IMPLICATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
FOOD SYSTEMS 
Jamie Baxter* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The legal institutions relevant to farmland succession—defined as the transfer 
of property in and control over farmland—are increasingly important determinants 
of sustainable environmental outcomes on modern farms.  The history of farmland 
succession has been written, by and large, through extra-legal processes of transfer 
and inheritance between generations of close family relations.  This familiar 
“family farm” model, however, is rapidly being replaced by succession 
arrangements between non-relatives, often strangers, with entrant farmers from 
non-agricultural backgrounds.  As a growing number of current farmers retire and 
seek creative ways to transfer control and ownership of their farms, the availability 
and content of property arrangements on farmlands acquire a new significance.  
The resulting “formalization” of farmland succession places greater demands on 
policy makers to craft farmland tenure options and supporting institutions that are 
suitable to a wider diversity of needs, particularly among small farmers, and to 
consider the impacts of these arrangements for sustainable food systems over the 
long term. 
Environmental degradation of farmland resources and surrounding ecosystems 
in Ontario, Canada—the focus of this study—and elsewhere is by now a well-
established trend.1  This result, it seems, is aligned with the eroded perception that 
farmlands are no longer “natural” resources at all.  As agricultural products are 
increasingly treated like any other mass-produced commodity, their sites of 
production are likewise distinguished from, and placed in opposition to, the natural 
environment.  One feature of this dissociation between agriculture and the 
environment is that farmlands and food production are, as Wendell Berry describes, 
divorced from their historical contexts:2 
To the extent that we participate in the industrial economy, we do not know the 
histories of our families or of our habits or of our meals.  This is an economy, and 
in fact a culture, of the one-night stand.  I had a good time,” says the industrial 
lover, “but don’t ask me my last name.”  Just so, the industrial eater says to the 
svelte hog,  “We’ll be together at breakfast. I don’t want to see you before then, 
and I won’t care to remember you afterwards.” 
                                                                                                     
 * LL.M. Candidate, Yale Law School. 
 1. For a particularly dramatic example, see GLEN C. FILSON, INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY:  A FARMING SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 8 (2004) (noting the wide public attention attracted 
by the contaminated water tragedy in Walkerton, Ontario in 2000, where e-coli bacteria from an 
intensive beef operation seeped into the town water supply, injuring 2,000 people and killing seven). 
 2. Wendell Berry, The Whole Horse: The Preservation of the Agrarian Mind, in FATAL HARVEST: 
THE TRAGEDY OF INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE 7 (Andrew Kimbrell ed., 2002).  
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In part, the new social, economic and political realities of farm production are 
now being constructed through the legal institutions and instruments that determine 
paths of farmland succession.  Berry reminds us that attention to the way that these 
processes have been carried out in the past, as well as the ways in which they are 
changing, can help to reconnect food production with positive environmental 
outcomes, including reduced reliance on harmful pesticides and other chemical 
inputs, improved soil, air and water quality management, increased biodiversity, 
and a reduced threat of farmland loss. 
In this Essay, I argue that when farmland tenure for entrant farmers is made 
more secure, they will have better incentives to engage in practices and investments 
that produce these environmental benefits, and they will have improved capacity to 
achieve this through access to loan and credit markets.  Part II of the Essay 
describes the modern socioeconomic context of farming in my case study of the 
province of Ontario in Canada and discusses the specific content of “environmental 
benefits” to which farmland tenure policies should be directed.  Part III outlines 
briefly how farmland succession has evolved from the family farm model.  Part IV 
develops an account of the legal institutions connecting farmland tenure security 
and positive environmental outcomes, which leads to an evaluation, in Part V, of 
environmental impacts of the various land tenure arrangements available to parties 
to succession agreements.  Finally, in Part VI, some of institutional conditions 
surrounding land tenure at the municipal level are discussed. 
II.  ONTARIO SMALL FARMS & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Most of Canadians’ food is now being produced on larger farms that are 
increasingly specialized in their mode of production.  These large enterprises tend 
to embrace industrial, Fordist-type production models that deploy mechanical and 
chemical technologies, capture the logic of comparative advantage, and seek to 
maximize farm efficiencies—measured by the quantity of food produced per unit 
cost—by capturing economies of scale.  Just 2% of domestic farms now produce 
35% of the food consumed by Canadians.3  Much of this production is now located 
on very large farms: in 2011, more than 9,500 farms in Canada had $1 million or 
more in gross farm receipts, a 31% change from five years earlier.4  In 2006, farms 
of this size accounted for more than 40% of the total receipts in that year but 
representing only 2.6% of the total farms in the country.5 
At the farm level, these trends are realized in larger farms by land area, and in 
larger quantities of foodstuffs produced on each farm.  In Ontario, the number of 
farms in the province dropped from 109,887 to 57,211 in the fifty years between 
                                                                                                     
 3. HUGH MAYNARD & JACQUES NAULT, BIG FARMS, SMALL FARMS: STRATEGIES IN 
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE TO FIT ALL SIZES 5 (Agricultural Institute of Canada Discussion Paper, 
2005). 
 4.  STATISTICS CAN, SNAPSHOT OF CANADIAN AGRICULTURE: CHAPTER 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/95-640-x/2012002/01-eng.htm. 
 5. STATISTICS CAN., THE FINANCIAL PICTURE OF FARMS IN CANADA (2009), available at 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/ca-ra2006/articles/finpicture-portrait-eng.htm.  
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1966 and 2006.6  The average land area per farm increased over the same period 
from 162 to 233 acres.  Perhaps most striking is the nearly exponential growth in 
output per farm.  An average Ontario hog farm in 1966, for example, had a total 
animal stock of 46 hogs, compared to 971 hogs in 2006.  Likewise, the average 
number of hens and chickens per farm has skyrocketed over the past half-century 
from 694 to 5,962 animals.7  These trends represent both an increase in the overall 
scale of production, as well as much greater specialization toward fewer food 
products being grown on each farm.  
Consequently, small farms engaged in more diversified modes of production 
are disappearing from Canada’s rural landscape, while those that still exist struggle 
to remain economically and socially viable. Sixty-four percent of Canada’s 
smallest farms in 1996 suffered product sales of $40,000 or less, were actually 
losing money, and posting an average loss of $9,500.8  In 2005, approximately 71% 
of farms in Canada with receipts less than $25,000 did not report enough on-farm 
income to cover their operating expenses.9  Even for those small farms making a 
profit, margins have remained very narrow.  Driven by financial pressures, and in 
light of increasing land values from urban and suburban expansion, many small 
farms, especially those at the urban-rural boundaries, have sold their farmland and 
abandoned farming altogether. 
Despite the difficult conditions under which small farms now operate, they 
hold significant promise for re-aligning modern food production with positive 
environmental outcomes, as discussed below.  As such, it is important to recognize 
that small farms are themselves evolving as a result of changing producer values 
and capacities, and in response to shifting consumer demands.  First, small farmers 
have been motivated to diversify their operations—both in terms of outputs and 
production models—to take advantage of “niche” food markets and to move into 
non-food areas such as agri-tourism and conservation services.  Indeed, small 
farmers have been leaders in developing and re-discovering organic methods to 
provide for the growing market in foods produced without the use of chemical 
fertilizers and pesticides.10  Small farmers also tend to exhibit the flexibility that 
allows them to move into specialty foods markets, such as garlic and ginseng 
production.11  In addition to food markets, small farmers have begun to expand into 
                                                                                                     
 6. STATISTICS CAN., A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF AGRICULTURE, CANADA AND PROVINCES: 
CENSUS YEARS 1921 TO 2006 (2009), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/95-632-
x/2007000/t/4185570-eng.htm#35. 
 7. Id.  However, it is also important to note that a “hog” farm in 1966 would have been much more 
likely to also raise other animals. 
 8. NATURAL RESOURCES CAN., THE ATLAS OF CANADA – SMALL FARMS BY CENSUS DIVISION, 
1996 (2009), available at 
http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/economic/agriculture/agriculture1996/smallfarmsbycd1996/1. 
 9. STATISTICS CAN., supra note 4.   
 10.  But see L. Berlin, W. Lockeretz & R. Bell, Purchasing Foods Produced on Organic, Small and 
Local Farms: A Mixed Method Analysis of New England Consumers, 24 RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD 
SYSTEMS 267, 267-8 (2009) (noting consumer preferences for organics as a rejection of 
industrialization, but observing that organic agriculture is itself perceived as becoming more 
industrialized).  
 11. NATURAL RESOURCES CAN., supra note 8.   
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non-food areas. Agri-tourism, including on-farm vacation experiences, bed and 
breakfasts, and farm tours, has demonstrated some promise for small farmers 
seeking to move away from more traditional forms of agricultural organization. 
A second feature is that among small farms that remain financially viable, 
most provide only a secondary income source for farm owners.  An increasing 
number of small farmers have jobs “off the farm.”12  In 2005, more than half of 
farm operators on farms with between $50,000 and $100,000 in gross revenue were 
engaged in some form of work off-farm.  For large farms with revenues over 
$250,000, this number was less 30%.13  The social, economic, and intra-family 
dynamics of the choice to work off the farm for small farmers are increasingly 
recognized as complex.  For example, Alasia et al. find that family, community and 
regional characteristics are more significant determinants of decisions to work off 
the farm for smaller farm-holders than for those on larger farms.14  Overall, it is 
clear that small farms on which individuals and families live and work as full-time 
farmers are an increasingly fading reality.  
A.  Policy Rationales and Outcomes 
What is the basic policy rationale for supporting small-scale agricultural 
production in order to realize environmental benefits?  The answer, in short, is that 
small farms tend to employ production methods and land management practices 
that improve soil, water, and air quality rather than depleting these valuable natural 
resources.  These methods often include reduced pesticide use, fewer off-farm 
inputs such as synthetic fertilizers, and greater reliance on renewable forms of 
energy.15  While comprehensive empirical work on the relationship between small 
farms and the environment has been relatively sparse, a growing number of studies 
are now being undertaken to flesh out the details of this relationship.  Tavernier and 
Tolomeo, for example, find a statistically significant relationship between farm size 
and deployment of “sustainable” agricultural methods.16  Small farm production is 
                                                                                                     
 12. Susan Machum, The Persistence of Family Farming in the Wake of Agribusiness: A New 
Brunswick, Canada Case Study, 36 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 377, 379-380 (2005).  See generally Edmund 
M. Tavernier et al, The Role of Farm Ownership in Off-Farm Work Participation, 26 AGRIC. & 
RESOURCE ECON. REV. 67 (1997) (discussing the determinants of farm owner decisions to work off-
farm). 
 13. Alessandro Alasia & Ray D. Bollman, Off-Farm Work by Farmers: The Importance of Rural 
Labour Markets, 8 RURAL & SMALL TOWN CAN. ANALYSIS BULLETIN 1, 4 (2009). 
 14. Alessandro Alasia et al., Off-Farm Labour Decision of Canadian Farm Operators: 
Urbanization Effects and Rural Labour Market Linkages, 25 J. RURAL STUD. 12, 13 (2009) 
(interestingly, this study also found that the choice to work off the farm was not significantly impacted 
by proximity to urban centres); see also STATISTICS CAN., OFF-FARM LABOUR DECISIONS OF 
CANADIAN FARM OPERATORS IN 2001:  THE ROLE OF OPERATOR, FARM, COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL 
DETERMINANTS (2007), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/21-601-m/21-601-m2007085-
eng.pdf.  
 15. Leo Horrigan, Robert S. Lawrence & Polly Walker, How Sustainable Agriculture Can Address 
the Environmental and Human Health Harms of Industrial Agriculture, 10 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 445, 
446 (2002).  
 16. Edmund M. Ravernier & Vic Tolomeo, Farm Typology and Sustainable Agriculture:  Does Size 
Matter?, 24 J. SUSTAINABLE AGRIC. 33, 43 (2004). 
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also demonstrably more likely to increase biodiversity and to be compatible with 
conservation measures on sensitive non-agricultural land. 
From a governance perspective, small farm production models also have the 
potential to integrate closely with community decision-making and localized social 
and economic networks toward promoting positive environmental outcomes at the 
community and regional levels.  Local community integration (i) improves 
education and knowledge transfer between farmers, consumers, and other 
community members about environmentally positive practices and outcomes,17  (ii) 
facilitates the “embeddedness” of local food systems, which increases trust 
between producers and consumers,18 inter alia reducing the need for complex 
regulatory and labeling schemes (such as vegetables and meats officially labeled 
“organic”), and (iii) harmonizes farming practices and food supply with regional 
and municipal planning processes as part of “sustainable rural development” 
models now being widely employed.19  I briefly describe each of these governance 
dimensions below. 
(i)  Education and Knowledge Transfer.  This aspect of community-level 
integration has at least three elements.  First, cooperative farmer marketing 
programs help to educate consumers about eating seasonally and about on-farm 
practices.  As part of a long-term study of local food systems through the 
Sustainable Agriculture Research and Education Program (SAREP) in California, 
Gail Feenstra has identified important stakeholders in these processes including 
municipal governments, school boards and other learning institutions, waste 
management officials, community advocacy groups, entrepreneurs, and local food 
policy councils.20  Second, farmer-to-farmer knowledge transfer can help to 
develop farming practices that lead to improved environmental outcomes (on both 
large and small farms) and are matched to local climate and ecological conditions.  
Third, where the preferences of community members strongly prioritize 
environmental benefits—which is often the case when individuals experience the 
direct impacts of farming operations in their local communities—these preferences 
will be translated more readily to small farmers within that community, compared 
to larger operations that focus on national or international markets.  Similarly, on-
farm practices will be easier to monitor directly by local consumers, producing 
more rapid conformity to environmental preferences and policies.  
(ii)  Embeddedness and Trust.  According to Clare Hinrichs, 
[d]irect agricultural markets, based on face-to-face links between producers and 
                                                                                                     
 17. Gail Feenstra, Creating Space for Sustainable Food Systems:  Lessons from the Field, 19 
AGRIC. & HUMAN VALUES 99, 101 (2002). 
 18. C. Clare Hinrichs, Embeddedness and Local Food Systems:  Notes on Two Types of Direct 
Agricultural Market, 16 J. RURAL STUD. 295, 296 (2000);  see also Colin Sage, Social Embeddedness 
and Relations of Regard: Alternative ‘Good Food’ Networks in South-West Ireland, 19 J. RURAL STUD. 
47, 47 (2003); Michael Winter, Embeddedness, the New Food Economy and Defensive Localism, 19 J. 
RURAL STUD. 23, 24 (2003).   
 19. Patrizia Pugliese, Organic Farming and Sustainable Rural Development: A Multifaceted and 
Promising Convergence, 41 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIS 112, 112-113 (2001). 
 20. Feenstra, supra note 17.   
2013] INSTITUTIONS OF FARMLAND SUCCESSION 387 
 
consumers, present an apparent counterpoint to large scale, more industrialized 
systems of food production and distribution . . . .  If relations between producers 
and consumers are distant and anonymous in more global food systems, in local, 
direct markets, they are immediate, personal and enacted in shared space.21 
Hinrichs and others have deployed the concept of “embeddedness” to represent the 
ways that agricultural markets operate within complex social networks.  A 
dominant feature of these networks is their dependence on and promotion of trust 
between producers and consumers—replicating, in part, the kinds of dynamics that 
have been central to informal farm succession arrangements in the past (see Part V, 
below, for a detailed discussion).  The buildup of this intra-community trust fills 
the role that many complex and often confusing nationally or internationally 
regulated labeling schemes play in conveying information to consumers about 
environmentally relevant production practices.  Examples include labels such as 
“organic,” “natural,” and “pesticide free.”  Where consumers can access farmers 
directly to obtain information about production practices and where a relationship 
of trust exists, the necessity for these labels dissipates markedly.  In turn, consumer 
responses put positive and constructive pressure on farmers to improve 
environmental outcomes. 
(iii)  Sustainable Rural Development.  Sustainable development—that is, 
development defined at the intersection of economic growth, improvement of 
social conditions and social justice, and conservation of natural resources and 
values22—has become a popular concept for rural communities and policy makers.  
Patrizia Pugliese has identified a “convergence” between rural sustainable 
development policies and those that support small farm production, with farmers 
themselves becoming key actors in democratic governance and decision-making.23  
Small farms can therefore be seen as part and parcel of policy initiatives and 
planning processes in rural communities that aspire to environmentally positive 
outcomes on a broad scale. 
In addition to direct environmental impacts and indirect impacts through local 
governance, a final policy rationale to support small farms is that, because of their 
low profit margins, small farms are also highly vulnerable to residential and 
business development pressures, such that their precarious social and economic 
position is likely to contribute to irreversible farmland loss.  Ontario currently 
contains 52% of Canada’s most productive (“Class 1”) farmland and led all other 
provinces in gross farm receipts in 2010.24  However, Ontario is also the country’s 
most populated province, with high population densities in the large urban centres 
in the south of the province.  As the result of persistent urban sprawl, this farmland 
                                                                                                     
 21. Hinrichs, supra note 18, at 295. 
 22. Pugliese, supra note 19, at 113.  
 23. Id. at 117. 
 24. Wayne Caldwell & Steward Hilts, Farmland Preservation:  Innovative Approaches in Ontario 
60 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 66, 67 (2005); STATISTICS CAN., FARM AND FARM OPERATOR 
DATA (2012), available at http://www29.statcan.gc.ca/ceag-web/eng/ (Ontario farm receipts in 2010 
totaled $11,890,835,395; Alberta was close behind with total farm receipts of $11,436,180,505 in the 
same year). 
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base is being steadily eroded and replaced by housing developments and other 
suburban and peri-urban, non-farm uses.  These pressures at the urban-rural 
interface have resulted in the creation of tens of thousands new non-farm 
residential lots in the last several decades.25  While recent provincial initiatives 
such as the “Greenbelt Plan”26 and the “Places to Grow Act”27 have begun to 
enforce regulatory controls that attempt to contain development pressures, it is 
unlikely that the problem of farmland loss can be addressed comprehensively 
without supporting the overall viability of farms themselves, particularly those 
small farms at the margin.   
Two caveats regarding a focus on small farms, and the resulting small 
farm/large farm distinction, are required.  The growing concentration of Canada’s 
food production on large, industrially-oriented farms, and the comparative 
environmental benefits realized from the ways that small farms produce food, have 
tended to suggest, to some, an inevitable and irreconcilable clash between these 
two divergent modes of food production.  Support for small farms has been 
matched with strategies to dismantle the existing industrial agricultural 
establishment—through regulatory change, standard setting, and a transformation 
in consumer preferences—and to fill in the resulting gaps with production from 
small farm enterprises.  I suggest, from a pragmatic standpoint, that the role of 
small farms in providing positive environmental outcomes is considerably more 
complex than this trajectory implies.  There are at least two main reasons why the 
small farm/big farm dichotomy is an oversimplification.  First, small farms have 
traditionally been a main repository for knowledge about environmentally positive 
practices and have served as sites of experimentation and learning about new 
techniques, methods, and technologies to improve environmental and food safety 
outcomes.  In support of this role, small farms tend to be more closely connected to 
their local communities and serve as ideal places to build awareness about the 
environmental impacts of food production.  This learning and awareness-building 
capacity has the potential to spillover into larger-scale agricultural practices, both 
through farmer-to-farmer learning and through public/consumer demand for 
changing practices.  This approach suggests that forging connections between small 
and large farm operators can lead to better environmental outcomes on both types 
of operations. 
Second, as discussed above, the agricultural sector as a whole is currently 
facing the threat of farmland loss from suburban and rural estate development.  
While small farms are more vulnerable to farmland loss, given their weaker 
financial position, even large farms are often unable to resist strong pressures in 
favour of development—especially those in very close proximity to rapidly 
expanding urban areas.  In addition, the loss of small parcels of farmland can have 
a pervasive cumulative effect on rural communities and the rural landscape, 
creating social and political tensions between divergent interests and distracting 
                                                                                                     
 25. Caldwell & Hilts, supra note 24. 
 26. Greenbelt Act, S.O. 2005, c. 1 (Can.);  see also ONT. MINISTRY OF MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS & 
HOUS., GREENBELT PLAN (28 Feb. 2005), available at http://www.mah.gov.on.ca/Asset1277.aspx.   
 27. S.O. 2005, c. 13 (Can.). 
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away from comprehensive policies to encourage positive environmental outcomes.  
From this standpoint, both small and large farms face many similar challenges, 
meaning that policy responses supporting small farm production are not necessarily 
antithetical to significant changes in the relationship between large farm enterprises 
and the environment as well.   
III.  FARM SUCCESSION 
Farmland succession encompasses the devolution of property in and control 
over the farm operation.  At the heart of this process lies a transfer of rights or a 
change in the social roles between parties to the succession.  Pottery and Lobley 
observe that “the processes of succession and inheritance which give rise to, and 
are the product of, certain lifecycle events may define critical transitions when farm 
business restructuring, expansion and retrenchment is most likely to take place.”28  
Important features of these transition processes—features of growing significance 
in recent years—are changes in the land tenure arrangements that underlie 
ownership of and control over the farm operation.  Institutional reforms that 
address the tenure insecurity inherent in these transitional periods can lead to 
positive environmental outcomes on small farms by (i) supporting farmland 
conservation in the face of development pressures, (ii) prioritizing specific 
environmental objectives, and (iii) increasing the economic viability of small farm 
enterprises overall.  
The sociological and demographic context of farm succession has changed 
rapidly over the last few decades.  The traditional model of farm succession turned 
on a gradual transition from older to relatively young generations within a nuclear 
or extended family.  Newer models of succession, by contrast, occur between 
unrelated individuals or groups and require an increasing degree of “legalization” 
to structure complex succession arrangements.  Two trends illustrate the dramatic 
shift in the way farm succession is taking place.  One trend is that the majority of 
the aging population of farm operators lacks a family successor. In 2006, 43% of 
current farm operators in Ontario were fifty-five years or older.29  The average age 
of operators in the province was 52.6, up from 49.4 only a decade earlier.30  As of 
2007, in Canada as a whole, 35% of farm operators were expected to retire in the 
next fifteen years, representing a total of 74,000 farms across the country.31  Three-
quarters of these farms are one-generation farms, in which there is no operator of a 
younger generation to take over the farm.  As the current farming population grows 
older, this trend results in an increasing demand for “alternative” succession 
                                                                                                     
 28. Clive Potter & Matt Lobley, The Farm Family Life Cycle, Succession Paths and Environmental 
Change in Britain’s Countryside, 47 J. AGRIC. ECON. 172, 185 (1996). 
 29. STATISTICS CAN., CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM OPERATORS, CANADA AND PROVINCES:  CENSUS 
YEARS 1991 TO 2006 (2009), available at  http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/95-632-x/2007000/t/4185586-
eng.htm#35. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Lois James, Director, Renewal Division, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, A Canadian 
Perspective on Intergenerational Farm Transfers and Succession Planning, Presentation to International 
Farm Succession Conference in Ottawa, Ontario (Aug. 6-8, 2007). 
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arrangements that move away from the single operator-to-operator transfers.  The 
increasing complexity of these succession arrangements, in turn, places creative 
pressure on the development of flexible land tenure.  
A second trend is that farmland is increasingly expensive, prohibiting entry 
into the agricultural sector by new farmers, even on small farms.  Cressman notes 
that “[t]he present generation of farmers have [sic] taken their profits and 
reinvested them back into their businesses and in the process have driven up asset 
values.  These high asset values, while desirable in the eyes of the present 
generation, are also going to cause the succession issues to be more complicated 
and challenging than at any point in modern history.”32 
The increasing complexity of succession arrangements as the result of these 
two trends implicates land tenure arrangements in at least three ways.  First, 
retiring farmers who are unwilling to sell the farm outright—perhaps because they 
want to ensure that the farmland is protected from development and/or 
environmental degradation, or because they want to remain living on the farm—
need to be able to continue generating an income from the farm operation.   
Whereas in the past farm families residing on the farm were composed of two or 
more generations, this is increasingly infeasible where younger generations are 
declining to be the primary successors.  Second, and in relation to the first 
implication, the increasing proliferation of non-family succession arrangements 
invariably leads to the legalization and formalization of these arrangements.  
Informal arrangements between family members are being or will need to be 
replaced by legal institutions that lay out the specifics of these increasingly 
complex arrangements.  Third, and finally, high land values that prohibit the 
outright purchase of farms by new, non-family farmers are increasing the cause of 
demand for land tenure arrangements that allow for incremental succession and 
shared farm management—perhaps between more than one new farmer.  Whereas 
traditional models of farm succession were premised on the assumption of 
unilateral control by a single operator or family, financial realities for new farmers 
as well as the retirement demands of current farmers are likely to drive the way that 
modern small farms are operated toward models that incorporate multiple owners 
and land users.33  
The result of this complexity, motivated by the trends discussed above, is the 
increased risk of tenure insecurity that threatens environmental outcomes on small 
                                                                                                     
 32. Richard J. Cressman, Farm Family Succession in the 21st Century (July 2000) (unpublished 
MBA Thesis, University of Guelph Faculty of Agricultural Economics and Business), available at  
http://www.cressman.net/thesis.html (“The price of farmland has also spiraled upwards.  The acre of 
land that could be purchased for $800 in 1971 was selling for over $5000 per acre in 1999.  It is 
noteworthy that both machinery costs and land costs have increased approximately 600% in the past 
three decades [to 2000]”). 
 33. Id. (“The reason these issues are so important today is because we are being faced with a 
paradigm shift in how the next generation of farmers will need to view the ownership of assets.  The 
thinking that ‘this is mine’ and ‘I am the boss’ will need to give way to ‘this is ours’ and ‘how can we 
manage this together’.  This is a monumental shift in thinking if one considers that for the past 300 years 
North American agriculture has operated under the ‘I and my’ paradigm vs. the ‘we and ours’ 
paradigm.”). 
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farms.  The next section, Part IV, examines the theoretical framework connecting 
increased tenure security and improved environmental outcomes.  I then move on 
in Part V to apply these theoretical insights and discuss implications for 
institutional reforms surrounding farmland succession relevant to small farms in 
Ontario.  
IV.  LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
Researchers, policy makers and activists now widely acknowledge that 
“institutions matter” for a range of human objectives.34  Institutions—both formal 
rule-based frameworks and non-formal social norm-based frameworks—
circumscribe decision-making processes for individuals and within groups.  By and 
large, institutions determine the constraints attached to human activities (economic, 
social, political), and therefore contribute to the relative benefits of those activities 
across a range of personal and community valuations.  The primary institutional 
arrangements discussed in this essay are the land tenure regimes that determine 
how property in farmlands can be structured through periods of succession.   
A focus on institutions draws attention away from narrow behavioral and 
market price models that limit analyses to the link between individual decision-
making and outcomes.  This conceptual shift is welcome in the area of farmland 
succession, where research—primarily in Britain and mainland Europe—has relied 
heavily on micro-economic models to try to understand farmers’ behavior in 
decisions that link land use with environmental impacts.35  Potter and Lobley have 
recognized that the shift toward institutional perspectives has begun to create a 
more sophisticated basis for policy development:36 
True, there is general agreement that it is to the decisions of farmers that 
researchers must look in order to explain why [environmental] change is taking 
place. But this can be interpreted with varying degrees of sophistication, ranging 
from studies which merely connect an episode or trend to the management 
decision which produced it, to those which seek to uncover the policy and other 
influences which shape, constrain and enable decision making itself. Explanations 
have co-evolved with the policy debate surrounding agriculture and the 
environment as interest has shifted away from a narrow concern with immediate 
causes to underlying processes. 
Andrew Green has made the broader point in respect of the role of individuals 
and institutions to address environmental change at the national and international 
levels:37 
                                                                                                     
 34. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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 35. Lorne Søderkvist Kristensen, Claudine Thenail & Søren Pilgaard Kristensen, Landscape 
Changes in Agrarian Landscapes in the 1990s:  The Interaction Between Farmers and the Farmed 
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 36. Potter & Lobley, supra note 28, at 173. 
 37. Andrew Green, Bringing Institutions and Individuals into a Climate Policy for Canada, in A 
GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 248 (Steven Bernstein et al. eds. 2008). 
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Institutions create the framework within which individuals make choices and 
instruments operate. Each country has different institutions which determine what 
instruments may be chosen and how they are chosen. Not that these institutions are 
necessarily immutable. Some, such as constitutions, are hard to change. Others, 
such as administrative law arrangements for determining how decisions are made, 
can be changed much more readily. Failure to account for institutions, including 
whether or not they can be readily changed, will obstruct the development of 
effective polices. 
Green’s observations hint at two general and theoretical observations about 
institutions initially relevant for the analysis applied later in this paper.  One is that 
successful institutions are contingent on context.  A land tenure regime that leads to 
improved soil conservation and watershed protection under one array of political, 
economic, social, geographic, and historical markers, for example, may lead to 
different outcomes, or be less effective in reaching the same outcomes, under a 
different array of contextual factors.  A key lesson from this type of context 
contingent approach will be that local policy making around farmland succession is 
likely to be more sensitive to relevant contextual factors and ancillary institutions 
compared to national or provincial schemes.  A focus on the municipal level is 
therefore appropriate—although land tenure and planning often intersect 
importantly with provincial initiatives and policy directions. 
A second general insight about institutions is that they are dynamic and path-
dependent.  On one hand, some institutional arrangements, given the right 
conditions, may themselves evolve over time in the direction of supporting positive 
environmental outcomes in response to demand pressures.  For example, increased 
demand for organic produce may drive farmers to adopt organic practices and 
develop land tenure arrangements—based on private contracts—to support this 
transformation.  On the other hand, some institutions will exhibit varying degrees 
of rigidity and resistance to change, as a result of existing conditions that determine 
the relative costs of abandoning the status quo.38  Even as demand for organic food 
rises, the policy environment of high agricultural subsidies that support many non-
organic industrial-model farms provides little incentive for producers, either 
individually or as a group, to agitate for significant institutional changes, despite 
the growing financial crisis being faced by farmers in some sectors.  This “path 
dependence” of institutions is also evident in non-formal arrangements, which are 
often regulated by and the result of deep-seated community norms.  The resistance 
of these non-formal arrangements to change is likely to be significant for farmland 
succession, as discussed below.  Overall, institutional path dependence provides a 
central rationale, in some cases, for concerted action on behalf of governments to 
engage in institutional design.39 
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A.  Tenure Security 
Tenure security for small farmers can be defined as the level of predictability 
they enjoy in realizing and enforcing their property rights to use to land and to reap 
the valued benefits of that use—or, conversely, as the level of risk faced by farmers 
that those rights will not be realized or enforced.  This definition implicates both 
the precision with which property rights can be specified ahead of time, as well as 
the overall confidence of the owner-operator in the institutional architecture 
responsible for administering the tenure regime and enforcing predicted outcomes.  
How then is improved tenure security relevant to promoting positive 
environmental outcomes on small farms?  Tenure security is linked to these 
outcomes in at least two ways.40  First, increased tenure security improves 
incentives by the farmer to invest in environmentally sound practices over the long 
term, by increasing the likelihood that those practices will realize the expected 
environmental benefits.41  This rationale is especially important for those 
investments that require a long time to generate the expected benefits.  For 
example, sustainable energy initiatives on small farms, such as wind or solar power 
supplies, require large up-front capital expenditures for environmental benefits 
(reduced emissions) that are only realized over a number of years.  Likewise, 
organic farming operations rely heavily on the cultivation of high quality soils, 
which can only be achieved by intensive soil management practices such as 
composting and cover-cropping.  These processes are cumulative over periods of 
years and decades.  Farmers’ ability to realize the “pay-off” of investing in these 
initiatives will therefore be determined by the security of their (expected) property 
rights over the long-run. 
Second, new farmers requiring access to credit from financial institutions or 
other sources will need to ensure that their property rights are clearly defined.  The 
ability to collateralize farmland through mortgages and the like has, in the past, 
been a key ingredient in providing new farmers with access to land itself and to 
needed start-up capital.  More importantly, access to capital resources will be a 
prerequisite for new farmers to undertake the kinds of long-term investments in 
environmental resources described above.  As increased land prices have limited 
the ability of new farmers to access credit markets and have driven more complex 
succession arrangements such as farmland sharing, financial institutions may 
perceive this complexity as contributing to an increased risk of defaulting on debt.  
Secure tenure arrangements that clearly delineate the rights of all parties will help 
to mitigate this uncertainty and help to lower the cost of borrowing for new 
farmers. 
                                                                                                     
 40. See Michael R. Carter & Pedro Olinto, Getting Institutions "Right" for Whom?  Credit 
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V.  TENURE OPTIONS FOR SMALL FARM SUCCESSION 
In this section, I canvass the menu of land tenure options available to new 
farmers who want to access farmland and to exiting farmers seeking viable 
succession options.  I evaluate each of these options according to their implications 
for the tenure security of the relevant parties and connect these security impacts to 
their environmental consequences.  
Three broad categories of land tenure are discussed below.  First, I investigate 
the pervasiveness of non-formal tenure arrangements on farmland and consider the 
prospects of social norms frameworks for providing sufficient security of tenure.  
Second, I explore the prospects for non-ownership tenure agreements to result in 
positive environmental outcomes.  There is a widespread concern—in the 
theoretical and empirical literature—that non-ownership agreements such as leases, 
at least short-term ones, can significantly undermine tenure security compared to 
sole ownership, making the lessee and lessor less likely to make the investments in 
physical improvements, capital and technologies that are required to realize 
environmental benefits on small farms.  If the rationale of this “tenancy 
hypothesis” holds, then the realm of secure tenure options for new farmers is 
significantly narrowed.  As we will see, however, the general relationship between 
non-ownership agreements and tenure insecurity varies considerably according the 
length of the agreement, the form of rental remuneration (cash price of share crop), 
specific terms stipulating environmental practices, the proportionate investment 
contributions of the parties, and available purchase options or rights of first refusal.  
Land tenancy arrangements, when carefully crafted, have a good possibility of 
providing sufficient tenure security, while supplying needed flexibility for 
development long-term relationships between the parties.  Third, I examine the role 
of land trusts and conservation agreements, as a part of either sale or leasing forms 
of succession.  These tenure options represent a relatively new forms of succession 
tools that involve third-party owners/monitors to enforce specific rights and 
obligations associated directly with a piece of farmland.  Their growing popularity 
in recent years requires an exploration of their costs and benefits vis-à-vis other 
succession models. 
A.  Non-formal Tenure 
Before evaluating the potential environmental impacts of formal tenure 
arrangements on farmland—including leases and covenants—it is useful to 
understand the role played by non-formal institutions in providing tenure security 
in succession scenarios.  In the field of international development, the call for the 
formalization of land titling systems and property relations, particularly in 
developing country contexts, has been motivated by arguments that national or sub-
national governments are optimally positioned to provide for the predictable 
definition and enforcement of property rights on a broad scale.42  By legalizing land 
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rights under a centralized administrative system, formalists argue, tenure security is 
increased as a result of increased enforcement capacity and increased 
standardization that makes previously disparate, localized tenure systems 
cognizable to a wider population of potential users, investors, and creditors.  In 
turn, formalization is understood to promote positive environmental outcomes 
where tenure security in improved, on the basis of the rationales discussed in Part 
IV, above.  Some recent critical assessments, however, have called into question 
the generic logic of legalizing non-formal tenure arrangements, particularly where 
formal institutions would be mismatched to local conditions, understandings, and 
norms concerning the use and governance of land.43  The focus in any given 
context, these critics say, should be on whether the relevant institutional 
arrangements actually increase tenure security for rights holders and users. 
Despite the fact that the traditional “family farm” model is rapidly receding as 
the default process for farm succession, the strong inter-personal relationships that 
underpin this process are both practically significant, at least where rural 
communities remain relatively tight-knit, and also stand as an important reminder 
that non-formal institutions always persist as a pervasive backdrop to more 
formalized arrangements.  Tenure relationships that share characteristics of farm 
family ties—mutual trust, close proximity, repeated interactions, and reputational 
considerations that motivate social signaling—are likely to remain central 
considerations in farmland succession. 
Admittedly, there is little doubt that, at least in the Canadian context, any long-
term succession arrangement that seeks the transfer of control and ownership over a 
farm will be based on formal, legally recognized and enforceable property rights.  
But because succession processes can take place over a long period of time, non-
formal tenure arrangements may be particularly significant in the early stages of 
farm succession.  For example, where entrant farmers want to utilize land on a trial 
basis—perhaps to experiment with a diversified farm use previously unexplored by 
the existing landowner—non-formal arrangements may provide for sufficient 
security of tenure over the short term, while minimizing the transactions costs of 
more formal agreements.  This step-wise approach mirrors the traditional family 
succession model, where family successors carve out distinct enterprises on the 
farm without making these formally separate from the family business. 
Concerns about the potentially corrosive effects of “formalizing” these types 
of non-formal arrangements—for example, by stipulating contractual norms in a 
written lease agreement—presuppose relatively small, close-knit communities.  
One concern is that formal legal agreements are indicators of mistrust between the 
parties, based on the perception that where community and inter-personal ties are 
strong, legal contracts are unnecessary.  The requirement of trust and fair dealing in 
these relationships is based on the prospect of repeat interactions with community 
members over time.  Allen and Lueck note that in many rural areas  
[f]armers are part of a small ‘community’ of people who have known each other 
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most of their lives.  People would be quickly aware of anyone who cheated 
another and would avoid future dealings with that person.  For both a landowner 
and a farmer there is a long-term interest in maintaining a relationship.44  
As a result of the potential for repeated interactions between these community 
members, non-formal arrangements become self-enforcing for individuals who care 
about their future position in the social community. 
Linked to this possibility for repeated interactions are the general reputational 
effects that are particularly significant in small communities.  Social pressures that 
stress certain attitudes and behaviors for farmers may risk being undermined by a 
move toward formalization.  In a study of farm leasing relationships, Cole and 
Johnston find that tenants were keenly aware of community norms that required 
them to farm leased lands as if they were their own.45  These social 
pressures/norms defied the formal, legal interpretation of temporary leasing 
agreements, creating a certain perceptual tenure security that led to better soil 
conservation practices.   
It is, however, important to distinguish between community norms that 
structure tenure security, on the one hand, by improving certainty about the 
definition and consequences of property rights, and norms that support positive 
environmental outcomes directly, such as norms of conservation and land 
stewardship, on the other.  It is the former category of non-formal institutional 
arrangements that risk being undermined, in some situations, by the over-
legalization of tenure relationships.  The status and effect of the latter category, by 
contrast, is increasingly indeterminate in modern farming communities.  Whereas 
many traditionalist farmers extol values inherent in the small farm ethic that speak 
directly to norms of conservation and land stewardship, the widespread 
industrialization of agriculture has perhaps led to the erosion of these values, 
particularly where the use of off-farm inputs such as synthetic fertilizer and 
pesticides has decreased reliance on and attention to the integrity of ecological 
systems. 
B.  Lease Agreements 
New farmer entrants in farmland succession will frequently be confronted by 
financial constraints that prohibit full ownership of farmland.  Perhaps the most 
common way for new farmers to gain access to land is to enter into some form of a 
leasing agreement, likely as a preliminary step in a succession arrangement toward 
future purchase of the farm.  A primary benefit of short and medium term leases is 
that they provide an opportunity for new farmers and existing landowners to build a 
working relationship as the foundation for more permanent arrangements.  
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A significant problem with farmland leases, however, is that they may provide 
insufficiently secure tenure to produce environmental benefits and actually increase 
incentives toward the environmental degradation of the leased lands.  This 
possibility, known as the “tenancy hypothesis” has been widely debated in the 
economic literature.  Motivated by the increasing demand for rented farmland to 
satisfy the growing scale of agricultural production and the observed negative 
impacts of larger-scale farm operations on soil erosion and fertility, agricultural 
economists began to explore the impact of farmland ownership structure on these 
environmental outcomes.  The idea emerged that since tenant farmers are less 
likely to realize the long-term production benefits of investing in intensive soil-
management practices, leased lands would experience high levels of soil erosion 
compared to land that farmers owned themselves.  Drawing general insights from 
the logic of the tenancy hypothesis would imply that lease agreements may have 
negative tenure security effects for farm succession plans, leading to poor water 
and soil quality management, decreased investment in permanent technologies 
leading to environmental benefits, and decreased willingness to engage in 
conservation practices on environmentally sensitive areas of the farm.46  The 
tenancy hypothesis has particularly serious implications for organic farming 
operations that rely on intensive soil fertility management over relatively long 
periods of time.  
Empirical support for the tenancy hypothesis over nearly three decades has 
been largely mixed.  In an early cross-sectional study of farms in the United States, 
Lee found no statistically significant relationship between ownership structure and 
soil conservation practices.47  Localized studies employing similar survey 
techniques, however, argued that there were demonstrably reduced soil 
conservation measures and grassland restoration employed on leased lands.48  More 
recent quantitative studies have tended to confirm the tenancy hypothesis using 
surveys of tillage practices and the application of micronutrients to develop long-
term soil quality.49  Carolan confirms the general thrust of these statistical analyses 
in a qualitative study of tenant farmers in Iowa, where interviewees expressed 
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concerns that tenure insecurity diminished the possibilities to engage in practices 
supportive of positive environmental outcomes.50  Other authors, however, have 
declined to acknowledge any true consensus on the existence of or motivating 
factors behind the potential link between farm lease arrangements and diminished 
environmental quality.51   
A recent study of the “tenancy hypothesis” in the context of farmland 
succession suggests that the disagreement in the literature can be addressed by 
disaggregating the factors leading to potential insecurity for tenant farmers.52  
These factors include the length of the lease term, the form of rental remuneration 
(cash or crop share), verbal versus written agreements, and the precise definition of 
environmental obligations in the lease itself.  In general, written long-term leases 
(generally five years or longer) based on crop share arrangements are more likely 
to ensure the highest level of tenure security available to lessee farmers.  The 
impact of specific environmental obligations on tenure security, however, remains 
largely ambiguous.  This latter set of issues is addressed in the discussion of 
conservation covenants, below. 
Long-term leases tend to increase the chances that the tenant farmer will be 
able to realize the benefits of sound environmental practices in the future, although 
this will largely be determined by the specific practices employed.  For activities 
such as preventing soil erosion and water pollution, shorter-term lease periods 
provide sufficient security to realize immediate benefits.  Intensive soil fertility 
management, support for increased biodiversity, and investment in non-movable 
clean energy infrastructure, on the other hand, will likely require longer-term leases 
of many years or even decades.53  In addition to impacting the use of physical 
techniques and technologies, longer-term leases may also be required for tenant 
farmers to make significant human capital investments in good environmental 
practices.  Even within a relatively small area or region, the biotic characteristics of 
farmland can vary considerably.  Where acquired environmental knowledge is 
highly specific to certain farm areas, long-term leases can be key to establishing 
incentives for farmers to make these human capital investments.   
In light of these foregoing considerations, lease arrangements can include 
provisions that dramatically increase the tenure security of tenant farmers, even for 
shorter-term agreements.  Leases that contain an option for the tenant farmer to 
purchase all or part of the land at some specified time or on termination of the lease 
will supply an extra layer of security for these farmers and enables both the lessee 
and lessor to carry out full realization of the farmland succession process.  These 
provisions can take the form of either a right of first refusal—providing the tenant 
farmer an option to match third party offers to purchase—or of a straightforward 
option to purchase at a fixed price and some pre-determined future date or time 
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period.54 
Whether farmland owners receive cash payments in exchange for rented land 
or, alternatively, enter into crop-sharing agreements is also likely to be a factor in 
determining the environmental outcomes of farmland leases.  Crop share 
arrangements replace cash rent with an agreement to share the proceeds of sale 
from actual production on the land.  These types of agreements are often entered 
into as a risk-sharing mechanism to mitigate the adverse effects of crop yields and 
market prices.  Empirical work by Allen and Lueck,55 along with formal modeling 
by Dubois,56 has demonstrated that crop share agreements can increase the 
likelihood that tenant farmers will preserve topsoil and invest in better land-
management practice compared to cash-rent contracts.  The reason is that 
sharecroppers only receive a portion of the income from a given crop yield, which 
translates into reduced incentives for these tenants to exploit inputs paid for entirely 
by the landowner, such as soil quality and other environmental services. 
Sharecropping can also have direct impacts on the tenure security of tenant farmers 
by causing the landowner to become more involved in the farming practices being 
employed, increasing the stability of the landlord-tenant relationship for the future 
by increasing trust.57  These strong relationships may further facilitate a full-scale 
succession arrangement between the parties. 
A final concern about land leases is that they provide little protection against 
farmland loss.  In rural areas subject to strong pressures for residential development 
of farmlands, lease arrangements, regardless of their term length and other 
substantive content, will offer little tenure security for tenant farmers.  The 
continued availability of farmland for these tenants will be largely contingent on 
the goodwill of the landowner to resist the financial and other incentives created by 
these development pressures.  In cases where the farmland owner has strong 
personal incentives to keep their land in productive agricultural use, this goodwill 
may be sufficient.  But in these situations, land owners and tenant farms will likely 
want to consider additional legal agreements that guarantee farmland protection 
over the long-run.  Conservation covenants and land trusts, discussed next, when 
combined with leasing arrangements have a good potential for preserving 
farmlands while providing the institutional framework to support environmentally-
positive farming practices. 
Overall, it appears that some forms of lease arrangements are likely to provide 
a relatively high level of tenure security for tenant farms as the foundation for a 
succession arrangements aimed at the gradual transfer of farmland over several 
years.  Those leases that contemplate a long rental term, include a right of 
purchase, provide for share-cropping as a way to involve the land owner and build 
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mutual trust, protect against farmland loss and respect the social norms that have 
historically structured non-formal leasing arrangements have the best chance of 
realizing positive environmental outcomes.  
C.  Land Trusts and Conservation Easements 
Land trusts are nonprofit organizations that secure farmland tenure by holding 
property rights to land, by monitoring the subsequent uses of that land, and by 
enforcing specific obligations to protect the land base itself and to engage in certain 
environmental practices.  These organizations can acquire full ownership rights to 
farmland by purchasing the land outright, or they can hold a partial interest in the 
form of a special conservation agreement over the land, with title remaining vested 
in a private owner.58  As a means to combine private contractual agreements with 
quasi-public oversight, land trusts provide for a unique form of farmland 
succession with generally strong environmental protections.  
 Land trusts have been employed widely in Western Canada and in the United 
States, and have more recently garnered growing attention in Ontario.59  While land 
trusts have historically focused on land conservation for a range of natural areas 
such as grasslands, wetlands, and wooded areas, organizations aimed specifically at 
protecting farmlands for continued agricultural use are beginning to emerge as part 
of the institutional landscape.60  A main choice for current farmland owners 
looking forward to succession is whether to transfer full title in their farm to a land 
trust or to grant a conservation easement or covenant—collectively referred to as 
“conservation agreements”—for all or part of the farmland property.  If the 
landowner chooses the latter route, a second set of choices, often involving the 
succeeding farmer, will be in regard to the specific content of the conservation 
agreements itself.  Before discussing these options in relation to tenure security for 
the succession parties, I first provide a brief outline of conservation agreements as a 
tool for promoting positive environmental protections on farmlands. 
Mainly in response to concerns about rapid urbanization and the development 
of natural spaces at the urban fringes beginning in the mid-1970s, conservation 
agreements rooted in common law property doctrines began to receive some 
attention in Canada.  Around this time, municipalities started to contemplate the 
public purchase or expropriation of environmentally significant areas, for reasons 
of aesthetic quality, ecological integrity, and/or general planning purposes.  These 
options, however, posed significant financial and political barriers.  Conservation 
easements attracted some interest as an economically viable alternative.  These 
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municipalities recognized that purchasing conservation agreements to protect 
environmental features of lands, while leaving the fee title vested in private hands, 
was considerably less expensive, provided tax advantages, avoided direct 
maintenance costs, and ensured long-term protection of these natural spaces.61  
Conservation agreements, either in the form of a restrictive covenant or an 
easement, are specific conditions about what may or may not be done with a piece 
of land.  These conditions are registered directly on title to the land, and survive the 
transfer of that title between private owners.  In spite of their practical utility, 
however, the legal interpretation and enforcement of conservation agreements was 
somewhat precariously grounded in common law property doctrine.  The common 
law of easements and covenants developed with a focus on grants of affirmative 
rights to carry out specific activities, such as rights of entry or rights to fish or 
hunt.62  Conservation agreements, by comparison, normally disallow certain 
activities on the land.  So-called “negative” easements and covenants have been 
recognized very sparingly by the common law, and are frequently unenforceable 
against successors in title.63  These issues of common law interpretation therefore 
acted as a significant bar to employing conservation agreements as instruments for 
environmental protection, and very infrequently with respect to farmlands and 
agricultural uses.  
The common law barriers to enforcing conservation agreements were largely 
overcome by enactment of the provincial Conservation Land Act64 (the CLA) in 
1990.  Section 3 of the CLA provides for an owner of land to grant a conservation 
agreement to a conservation body specified under the Act for a specific list of 
purposes related to conservation.65  The CLA was amended in 2005 to include the 
right to grant an easement “for the conservation, preservation or protection of the 
land for agricultural purposes.”66  Under the CLA, conservation agreements run 
with title to the land and are enforceable against successors to the title in 
perpetuity.  A wide range of nonprofit organizations are eligible under the CLA to 
act as conservation bodies, including the federal, Ontario, or municipal 
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governments, conservation authorities, Indian Act bands, registered charities and 
their trustees, and any additional bodies proscribed under the regulations.67  This 
broad definition of “conservation bodies” has paved the way for independent 
nonprofit organizations to adopt primary roles in holding, monitoring, and 
enforcing conservation agreements, as well as in facilitating their creation and 
providing educational resources to rural communities and potential grantors.  The 
CLA also provides for mandatory assignment of an easement or covenant to the 
provincial Minister of Natural Resources in the event that a conservation body 
ceases to exist or becomes ineligible under the Act. 
Given the new availability of conservation agreements as instruments for 
farmland succession, landowners can elect either to grant a conservation agreement 
to a land trust and subsequently transfer the title to a succeeding farmer—which 
may also involve leasing the farmland in the short or medium term—or to transfer 
the fee simple directly to the land trust, which will subsequently administer leasing 
arrangements with new farmers.  
1.  Fee Purchase by a Land Trust 
The latter option offers some benefits by mitigating uncertainty about future 
farmland transfers for tenant farmers and making the ownership arrangement less 
vulnerable to legal challenges.  But, overall, this option has some severe 
restrictions more adequately addressed through the use of farm conservation 
agreements.  The potential environmental benefits of transferring fee title in 
farmland to a land trust are twofold.  First, when a land trust acquires title to 
farmland, that land is likely removed from private land markets entirely, at least for 
the short and medium term.  Tenant farmers who enter into leasing relationships 
with land trusts on these lands may therefore see their tenure security increased 
where their rental arrangements are viewed as more stable and more likely to be 
renewed.  Second, since farm conservation agreements are relatively new statutory 
instruments—and given the somewhat difficult history of easements and covenants 
at common law—they remain vulnerable to as yet untested in the Courts and may 
be subject to an unknown set of legal challenges.  Where tenant farmers regard 
their tenure security as undermined by this uncertainty about the content and 
enforceability of conservation agreements, full ownership by a land trust may be 
preferable.  Both of these factors may induce tenant farmers to invest in agricultural 
practices that lead to improved environmental outcome.  
On the other side of the ledger full title transfers present significant drawbacks.  
The most obvious downside of this route is that it almost certainly cuts off any 
opportunity for tenant farms to actually acquire an ownership interest in the land at 
some point in the future.  Farmland “succession” therefore stops at acquisition of 
title by the land trust.  While tenant farmers may experience some increased tenure 
security under this scenario compared to leases with private landowners, removing 
the possibility of acquiring any ownership interest likely provides significant 
disincentives for these farmers to invest in environmentally-positive practices.  
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Moreover, from a public policy perspective, it is likely to be undesirable for small 
nonprofit organizations to be administering a growing quantity of farmland.  The 
administrative costs of this option will invariably grow over time, and may prove to 
lack the flexibility to negotiate rental agreements that are sufficiently adaptable to 
specific pieces of farmland toward the best-possible environmental outcomes.  
Finally, the financial cost of acquiring full title is likely to be prohibitive for most if 
not all land trusts, particularly where land values are very high as the result of 
residential development pressures.  
2.  Farm Conservation Agreements 
Farm conservation agreements offer a viable alternative to the transfer of fee 
title to land trusts.  A central motivation for incorporating conservation agreements 
into farmland succession plans is to reduce the market value of the farm, making it 
more affordable for purchase by a succeeding farmer.  In addition to the direct 
environmental benefits of these agreements realized by ensuring that succeeding 
farmers adhere to good environmental practices and conservation goals, outgoing 
farmland owners accrue significant financial benefits from granting an easement or 
covenant to a conservation body.  Where the current landowner donates a 
conservation agreement, he or she receives tax advantages in the form of charitable 
receipts for the value of the agreement, as well as a potential capital gains 
exemption.68  While these tax benefits are unlikely to wholly offset the drop in 
market value of the farm from granting a conservation agreement—particularly 
where the development value of the land was high prior to the agreement—it is 
assumed that in many cases these tax benefits, when combined with the 
environmental benefits valued by the outgoing farmland owner, will provide 
sufficient incentive to grant the agreement.  A recent study of the economic 
viability of farmland conservation agreements in Ontario has demonstrated that this 
assumption holds under a number of plausible succession scenarios.69  In a limited 
number of cases, land trusts or other conservation bodies may have sufficient 
resources available to purchase conservation agreements from landowners at or 
near the market price. 
Conservation agreements likely offer an optimal level of tenure security for 
succeeding farmers and provide financial flexibility sufficient for many farmers, 
eventually, to acquire a full or partial ownership interest in the farmland.  As with 
the full purchase of farmland by a land trust, a primary benefit of conservation 
agreements is that they ensure that farmland will not be sold for non-agricultural 
purposes in the future.  Tenant farmers therefore gain significant tenure security 
against the threat of farmland loss.  Conservation agreements also create the 
opportunity for succeeding farmers to acquire an ownership interest in the farmland 
at a reduced price, increasing the incentive to invest in positive environmental 
practices immediately by improving the likelihood that these farmers will be able to 
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realize environmental outcomes in the future.  In addition, specific provisions are 
normally built into these agreements, including prohibited practices and obligations 
to protect certain ecological features or environmentally sensitive areas of the 
farmland.  These provisions help to clarify the property rights of farmers using the 
land and create certainty in any additional contractual arrangements surrounding 
the encumbered title.  Conservation agreements therefore have potential to create a 
two-fold effect on environmental outcomes, derived from (i) the specific 
obligations for conservation imposed in the terms of the agreement and (ii) the 
improve land tenure security that results from their use.  
As the statutory CLA scheme for conservation agreements—particularly the 
2005 amendments providing for farmland conservation—gains increasing attention 
and use, the comparative benefits of these instruments for succession arrangements 
are likely to grow.  One potential drawback in the interim is that this statutory 
scheme has not yet been tested widely in the courts.  As yet there is no body of case 
law to demonstrate under what circumstances, if any, conservation agreements 
might prove to be unenforceable.  For now, farmers who are concerned about the 
enforceability of these agreements may perceive them to be relatively insecure.  On 
the other hand, statutory conservation agreements provide a clear advantage over 
the complexity of common law easements and covenants.70  As well, there have 
been no concerns raised in growing research literature on these statutory 
instruments that they will prove to be insecure.  More pressing concerns for 
existing and succeeding farmers are the institutional preconditions for the 
successful monitoring and enforcement of conservation agreements, discussed in 
the next section, below. 
VI.  INSTITUTIONAL PRECONDITIONS 
A.  Municipal Land Use Plans and Zoning By-laws 
Municipal land use planning policy across rural Ontario reveals deep tensions 
between the need to preserve farmlands, rural communities and livelihoods on the 
one hand, and farmers’ demands for flexibility to meet changing markets and to 
adapt to new techniques and technologies on the other.  The former concern 
manifests in strict land use and zoning designations that attempt to “lock in” the 
existing rural landscape and preserve it for future use, while the latter is represented 
by a growing number of farmers, particularly new entrants, seeking to organize 
agricultural production around non-traditional models that incorporate food 
production, rural tourism, habitat preservation, and outdoor recreation.  This 
section considers how some of these planning policy areas and their resulting 
tensions impact on the tenure security of farmland succession arrangements.  Issues 
canvassed include farmland severance regulations and on-farm residency by-laws.  
The need for municipal planners and politicians to get these institutions “right” is a 
precondition for new and existing farmers alike, as they provide the legal 
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foundation and long-term vision to support succession arrangements that produce 
positive environmental outcomes.  Land use plans that determine the availability—
and therefore the price—of small farms also serve a key “gateway” function for 
entrant farmers, often with limited access to capital, searching for low-cost options 
to enter the agricultural sector.  Without the legal tools to create new spaces for 
small farms as existing ones are invariably lost to development pressures, there will 
be declining opportunities to realize the environmental benefits of these unique 
spaces. 
Since new farmers have an interest both in flexible municipal planning 
arrangements and in preserving farmlands and rural communities, they will likely 
have a key role to play in resolving the tensions between these two objectives.  As 
noted in Part III, above, small farmers oriented toward local community 
governance are well positioned to influence municipal policies through processes 
of knowledge transfer, market exchange within local social and economic 
networks, and participatory decision-making in broad-based sustainable rural 
development planning.  
Severance Regulations.  Rural municipalities increasingly struggle to control 
urban sprawl and prevent active farmland from being converted into non-
agricultural rural residential lots.  A key strategy in this struggle has been to limit 
rights to create new property lots on designated farmlands, as a means to prevent 
the gradual attenuation of agricultural spaces when landowners subdivide lands into 
may smaller residential lots (called “rural subdivisions”) or sever mid-size pieces 
of land to create rural estates.  Sometimes, these land planning controls take the 
form of minimum lot sizes that, for example, prevent a single large farm from 
being divided into one or more smaller farms.  Despite good intentions behind such 
planning regulations to prevent farmland loss, these arrangements can dramatically 
reduce the flexibility of existing and new farmers to design succession 
arrangements.  While some of these planning controls may improve tenure security 
for succeeding farmers by protecting agricultural spaces and the surrounding 
character of the rural community as a whole, they also risk undermining the same 
by limiting the ability of these farmers to shape succession arrangements as they 
evolve over extended periods of time.  For example, tenant farmers who invest in 
cultivating and improving soil nutrition and watershed quality on a specific land 
area within an existing farm, perhaps under a lease agreement, may be prevented 
from severing that land to create a new small farm at some point in the future.  This 
scenario might exacerbate some of the negative implications of the “tenancy 
hypothesis” for environmental outcomes discussed in Part V, above.  From an 
existing farmer’s perspective, lot severance controls might also prevent them from 
creating a small adjacent lot where they can retire from farming while maintaining 
a connection to the farm and enjoying the benefits of a rural lifestyle.  
Significantly, these types of planning controls are generally asymmetric, allowing 
for large farming operations to consolidate smaller acreages for additional cropping 
and pasture land.  The result is a one-way bias toward the growth of large farms at 
the expense of smaller ones. 
A plausible policy response to these challenges is for municipal planning 
406 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:2 
 
departments to tailor their regulations more closely to the types of land uses that 
attach to land subdivisions.  Experiences in Huron County—located in 
Southwestern Ontario close to the cities of London and Kitchener-Waterloo—
provide a good model.  Here, the county’s official land use plan created a scheme 
of specific exceptions for residential land severances, for both retiring farmers and 
for sons or daughters of existing farmers who assist on the farm.71  Land 
severances, with their own special conditions and regulations attached, were 
allowed for individual in these groups.  Clearly, this model would need to be 
updated to match the changing nature of farm succession, by allowing non-family 
entrant farmers to take advantage of the planning exceptions.  
On-farm Residency Rules.  Municipal rules that restrict the number of 
residences on the same farm can heavily impact on the viability of succession 
arrangements.  In order to prevent the spread of de facto rural subdivisions with 
multiple permanent or mobile housing units, municipal jurisdictions frequently 
restrict the construction of any residential buildings on agricultural land.  These 
rules are a good example of institutional failure to adapt to the evolving realities of 
farmland succession.  When the majority of farmland was transferred between 
generations within the same close-knit family, large single on-farm residences 
could easily accommodate two or more family generations within the same 
household.  But as farm succession has opened up to non-family individuals, the 
restricted supply of on-farm housing, and an inability to create new residences on 
farms, have been significant barriers to new farmers.  Not only is living off-farm 
likely to be more expensive, residence restrictions also represents a special form of 
tenure insecurity for entrant farmers by making them less likely to feel personally 
invested in and connected to the farm operation.72  The tenure insecurity associated 
with being prevented from living on the farm is closely aligned with a sense of 
place and a desire by many new farmers from non-farm backgrounds to integrate 
their working and personal lives within the same physical space. 
Everdale LandLink, a non-profit organization that supports new farmers 
located in Wellington County, northwest of Guelph, Ontario, has recently 
developed an initiative to help these farmers locate viable on-farm residency 
options, where they are available within existing institutional arrangements.  In this 
municipality, some exceptions do exist to the default rule against multiple on-farm 
dwellings, but these are generally difficult to navigate.  For example, secondary 
residences may be allowed on some designated agricultural lands, but require 
certain standards of proof to demonstrate that the proposed project will not hinder 
current or future agricultural uses.73  Legal expertise and access to information may 
therefore also be important considerations. 
The example of on-farm housing bylaws also provides some insight into why 
municipal planners may exhibit a level of resistance to institutional change.  Even 
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the brief survey of some select preconditions to environmentally positive farmland 
succession arrangements above reveals that municipal level policy making, in some 
respects, has not been sensitive to the changing social and economic context of 
farmland succession.  Is this result incompatible with the claim that policy making 
to support small farm is best enacted at the local level?  Not necessarily.  In large 
part, municipal jurisdiction over land use planning and zoning laws is 
circumscribed by the provincial Planning Act,74 which imposes specific 
requirements and limitations on local planning departments to meet provincial 
standards.  For example, the Planning Act imposes strict limits on the creation of 
temporary accessory dwelling units that might benefit new farmers in need of on-
farm housing.  The extent to which multiple levels of governmental control might 
make local decision-making less sensitive to the particular needs of rural 
communities is an open question, but one that deserves attention in future research.  
B.  Third-Party Conservation Bodies 
A second set of institutional preconditions relates to the potential for land 
trusts and conservation agreements to deliver their predicted environmental 
benefits.  These are discussed mainly in respect of conservation agreements 
(although similar concerns hold for land trusts hold title in fee).  Recall that a 
number of organizations are authorized under the CLA to hold conservation 
agreements as designated “conservation body,” including municipal councils, 
conservation authorities, charitable corporations, and any person or body 
specifically recognized in the regulations.75  A central concern is about the capacity 
of conservation bodies to monitor and enforce conservation agreements.  
Monitoring farmlands for compliance with the terms of a conservation agreement 
can be more or less costly, depending on the specific provision of the instrument, 
but costs will inevitably grow with the number of agreements under an 
organization’s control.  Likewise, enforcing conservation agreements may require 
organizations to set up a process of warnings to inform landowners about 
violations, and may ultimately require organizations to go to court to seek 
enforcement.  Preferably, conservation bodies will also provide positive support 
landowners to meet their commitments and avoid costly adjudication if possible.  
While public municipalities and conservation organizations are more likely to have 
the financial resources, expertise, and institutional capacity available to monitor 
and enforce conservation agreements, smaller non-profit organizations will face 
constraints and challenges.  The capacity of these organizations to monitor and 
enforce landowner commitments is necessary to realize the environmental benefits 
of conservation agreements.  An ongoing failure to ensure that commitments are 
strictly followed threatens the stability of this statutory scheme overall if these 
organizations themselves come to be viewed as illegitimate.  
 These concerns may be more prevalent in the short term as conservation 
agreements gain popularity.  Since, as noted above, farm conservation agreements 
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have generally been untested in the courts, initial challenges to the validity of these 
agreements risk ending up in costly legal battles.  Public organizations, not private 
bodies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are better suited to bear the 
costs of working out the legal contours of conservation agreements.  This suggests 
a larger role for municipalities and conservation organizations to hold conservation 
agreements in the short term, and perhaps a growing space for NGOs as the legal 
landscape and best practices develop over time. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The analysis in this essay reveals that the succession arrangements yielding the 
highest environmental benefits for existing and entrant farmers will be contingent 
on the specific contexts in which they are crafted.  While farmland succession has 
moved away from the traditional “family farm model,” the non-formal norms 
associated with these traditions and based on ideas of trust and community 
integration are likely to remain important determinants of environmental outcomes.  
New farmers in particular should pay close attention to these traditional models, 
such that existing norms do not undermine attempts to “formalize” tenancy 
contracts and other agreements.  With these norms in mind, parties to farmland 
succession arrangements now have a number of flexible legal instruments available 
to help them structure the appropriate incentives for improving environmental 
quality on farmlands and in surrounding ecosystems.  
Equally important is the institutional landscape that circumscribes connections 
between farmland succession and environmental outcomes.  As succession 
arrangements invariably move from the informal to the legal realm, municipal 
governments and third-party conservation bodies will likely continue to create new 
legal instruments and take on new roles to monitor and enforce existing 
agreements.  Overall this is a positive trend.  When local institutions become the 
focal point for policy development in this area, small farmers can utilize their 
comparative advantages to participate effectively in local governance and influence 
processes of decision-making.  These advantages include better knowledge transfer 
to and from the local community, stronger integration with local markets, and a 
tighter fit with sustainable rural development strategies.  With attention to these 
dimensions, new generations of small farmers stand a good chance of cultivating 
strong institutional linkages for improved environmental outcomes well into the 
future.  
